College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

2002

Supreme Court Selection as War
Michael J. Gerhardt

Repository Citation
Gerhardt, Michael J., "Supreme Court Selection as War" (2002). Faculty Publications. 984.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/984

Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Faculty and Deans

SUPREME COURT SELECTION AS WAR
Michael J. Gerhardt
I. INTRODUcriON

The most popular metaphor for describing the process by which Supreme
Court Justices are selected is war. The voluminous commentary on and records of
Supreme Court appointments are replete with characterizations of events in different
phases of the process in militaristic terms. 1 One need look no further for
confirmation of the continuing pull of the metaphor than to a recent article in the New
York Times on the likely dynamic in the next Supreme Court confirmation
proceeding: Neil Lewis' headline reads, From Quiet Nomination to Noisy Test for
Future Battles and he employs the term "battles" five times, besides the headline, to
describe what to expect when the next vacancy on the Court arises. 2
It is tempting to think that, after September 11, the bellicose rhetoric about
Supreme Court selection as war would dissipate. At the outset of George W. Bush's
presidency, some prominent Democratic Senators, strategists, and commentators had
warned that there would effectively be a ''war" if, after the Supreme Court's
controversial opinion in Bush v. Gore effectively awarding the presidency to him,
Bush tried to claim a mandate to nominate a conservative ideologue outside of the
mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence. 3 After September 11, some have
suggested that the war against terrorism obliges Senators (and others) to give the
President special deference on his judicial nominations because of their importance
for maintaining domestic tranquility and ensuring a fully staffed judiciary available to
properly monitor and process criminal proceedings coming out of the war against
terrorism. 4 Some explain that the President's judicial nominations generally require

•
Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. This Article is an
extended version of my talk delivered at Drake Law School as part of its recent Symposium on the
selection of Supreme Court Justices. I am grateful to Professor Thomas Baker for the opportunity to
participate in the Symposium and particularly to him and Stephen Carter for helpful comments on an
earlier draft. This Article is the first of at least two articles on federal judicial selection generally as
war.
I.
See, e.g., ETHAN BRONNER, BATILE FOR JUSTICE ( 1989).
2.
Neil A. Lewis, From Quiet Nomination to Noisy Test for Next Battles, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
26, 2002, at Al7.
3.
See, e.g., BUSHY. GORE: THE QuESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed.,
forthcoming June 2002).
4.
See, e.g., Editorial, A New Presidency, WAU.ST. J., Sept. 19, 2001, at A20.
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substantial deference so that he is not forced to squander on them the time and
political capital he needs to wage the war effort successfully.
The structure of the Constitution is plainly, however, designed to invite
conflict. Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court appointments process knows just
how combative, brutal, nasty, and vitriolic it can be. The structure of the
Constitution pits Presidents and Senators against each other in the federal
appointments process, and the framers fully expected (even hoped) conflicts would
ensue from this design. Their expectation was that the checks and balances of the
Constitution, including the distribution of authority on judicial appointments, were
designed, in Madison's famous phrasing, so that "ambition must be made to
counteract ambition. "5 The framers viewed conflicts over appointments as inevitable
and even desirable, as the branches each sought to aggrandize their respective powers
at the expense of the other. The likelihood if not inevitability of friction would
prevent one branch from becoming tyrannical.
Yet, the structure of the Constitution invites not only conflict but also
accommodation. In relatively short order, Presidents and Senators developed
informal accommodations or informal arrangements to reduce the inevitability of
conflict and yet preserve some realm of discretion with respect to each Supreme
Court appointment. These accommodations, expectations, or arrangements are what
I call norms. 6 Following the norms of the Supreme Court appointments process
promises not sanctions but peaceful coexistence between the branches.
My thesis is relatively simple: I suggest hostilities break out in the Supreme
Court selection process when the President, Senators, and/or nominees violate some
longstanding practices or expectations (some but not all of which constitute
institutional norms), or the governing norms are in flux. 7 I suggest this is true
regardless of whether the nation is at war. To be sure, the number of times that
Presidents in the midst of war have had vacancies on the Court to fill have been
relatively small, so small in fact that I think one should hesitate to draw any firm
lessons about such circumstances. History generally suggests, however, that a
fundamental dynamic in Supreme Court selection is Presidents' and Senators'
respective efforts to achieve short- and sometimes long-term objectives in the
particular circumstances in which vacancies on the Court have arisen. How well
Presidents and Senators achieve their respective objectives and discharge their allimportant duties relating to Supreme Court appointments depends on their

5.
THEFEDERAUSTNo. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
6.
Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments
Process, 50 DUKEL.J. 1687, 1690-96 (2001) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Norm Theory].
7.
For some prior discussions of this view, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CoNSTITimONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000) [hereinafter
GERHARDT, APPOINTMENTS]; Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra note 6, at 1696-98, 1710-14.
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compliance with and coordination of the governing norms and expectations at the
times appointments must be made. Presidents and Senators obviously do not perform
in a vacuum; context is all-important, but context does not guarantee particular
outcomes. The fact that the nation is at war is of course part of the context of present
times, but its relevance is not-and will likely not be-understood in precisely the
same ways or precisely from the same perspectives by Presidents and Senators. A
vacancy on the Court is surely an opportunity, but it is an opportunity that Presidents
and Senators are likely to view differently depending on the context. The context
might well include not just war but also the possibility of influencing or solidifying a
shift in the Court's direction, a possibility that neither Presidents nor Senators are
likely to discount for any reason. Indeed, trying both to understand and define the
social, political, and historical context in which a vacancy has arisen are among the
basic challenges in the process of Supreme Court selection. How well political
leaders manage the opportunities they perceive within a given context is a significant
measure of their performance and success.
My purpose in this Paper is not to be exhaustive but rather to illustrate some
significant patterns in Supreme Court selection. In characterizing these patterns, I
draw on two fields of study that have not yet figured prominently in the study of
Supreme Court selection: military strategy and institutional norms. Throughout my
Paper, I hope to demonstrate how synthesizing some of the lessons or insights from
these two fields helps to illuminate the dynamics of Supreme Court selection,
particularly how heated conflict is often the consequence of Presidents' attempts to
change or failures to accommodate the existing norms, longstanding practices, or
prevailing expectations regarding Supreme Court appointments.
In the first part of this Article, I will briefly clarify some basic features of my
framework for analyzing Supreme Court selection. I will clarify some basic
terminology, discuss the relevance of statistics, and identify some of the basic norms
in the Supreme Court selection process. These norms possibly include, among
others, senatorial courtesy (especially robust in the form of a nomination of a Senator
to the Court), good faith consultation with the Senate, nominees' fitting the basic
ethical and professional expectations of the times, timing and pace of nominations
(including avoiding them in election years), and responsible rhetoric in framing the
terms of initial debate.
With this general framework in mind, I posit two basic models of conflict in
Part II. In each, there is an imperial Senate desirous of primary control over Supreme
Court appointments. The first model is the conflict between an imperial Senate and
"warrior" Presidents who welcome hostilities as defining moments for themselves,
the process, and/or their political opposition. Warrior Presidents expect (and even
invite) war as a consequence of their deliberate attempts to shape or reshape the
norms or longstanding practices involved in Supreme Court selection. Warrior
Presidents have had mixed records of success (that is, getting their nominees
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confirmed under such circumstances), depending on a number of variables. Prime
examples ofsuccessful"warrior" Presidents are Andrew Jackson, Woodrow Wilson
with his nomination of Louis Brandeis, and Lyndon Johnson with his nomination of
Thurgood Marshall President Reagan's nominations ofRehnquist and Scalia, and
President Bush's nomination of Thomas also fit this pattern. Examples of less
successful "warrior" Presidents who were bent on changing the norms of Supreme
Court selection but suffered temporary setbacks are James K. Polk and Grover
Cleveland.
The second model is the conflict between an imperial Senate and Presidents
who have failed to adequately heed or account for a relatively robust institutional
norm or longstanding practice or expectation regarding Supreme Court selection. In
my opinion, most failed nominations fit into this category. As one might expect, the
reasons for these failures are varied, including the basic failures to meet senatorial
expectations and to learn from history (or predecessors' or even a given President's
own mistakes), overconfidence, and emotionalism. Examples that fit this pattern
include Lyndon Johnson's nominations of Fortas and Thornberry, and Richard
Nixon's nominations ofHaynsworth and Carswell.
The third Part consists of models in which war over Supreme Court selection
has largely been avoided. The first is capitulation or presidential abdication of
authority. The two Presidents who fit this model were Ulysses Grant and Herbert
Hoover. The second model consists of a spectrum of accommodating Presidents
and/or Senators who have manipulated or employed institutional norms to their
advantage or matched their nominations to fit prevailing expectations. Prime
examples include almost all of President Lincoln's Supreme Court nominees,
Franklin D. Roosevelt's choice of Hugo Black as his first Supreme Court nominee,
and both ofPresident Clinton's choices. This Part concludes with a discussion of the
importance of a President's recognition of the opportunities that chance presents him,
so that with the right timing, appreciation of the "framing" effect of rhetoric, and
consolidation or cultivation of political support, a President without a mandate ofhis
own can nevertheless peacefully work to shift or reshape either norms or
expectations, as occurred with Chester Arthur's nominations of Horace Gray and
Samuel Blatchford, and Theodore Roosevelt's nomination of Oliver Wendell
Holmes.
In the final part, I briefly discuss two patterns that can be inferred from a
survey of these four models in operation. The first involves the rhetoric employed in
Supreme Court confirmation contests, which tends to track the rhetoric of war. The
second involves the nominations made in times of war or those that might be
considered most closely analogous. Under such circumstances, Presidents have been
able to achieve relatively conflict-free confirmation proceedings for their Supreme
Court nominees when they rather than the Senate have been willing to bend or
compromise in either defining or trying to fill their criteria for selection.

2002]

Supreme Court Selection as War
II.

397

THE TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT

A few introductory clarifications are in order. The first is about the relevance
or significance of statistics. To date, roughly one in five Supreme Court nominations
has failed. 8 In his excellent study of the Supreme Court selection process, David
Yaloff notes that in the twentieth century eighty-nine percent of Supreme Court
nominees have been confirmed, and "twelve of fourteen nominees between 1970 and
1994 have garnered Senate approval.''9 For Yalof, these statistics underscore the
huge importance of the nomination phase of the Supreme Court appointment
process. 10
There are, however, two caveats I would add to Yalotrs analysis. First, one
would be wrong to infer that success can be so narrowly defined as confirmation of a
nominee. Sometimes, getting a nominee confirmed can be a Pyrric victory. For
instance, the Senate confirmed Clarence Thomas in the narrowest vote yet for a
successful Supreme Court nominee, but the fight was so bruising as to cost President
Bush more political support than he had hoped to gain. Even though the Senate
overwhelmingly confirmed President Clinton's two Supreme Court nominees, it is
hard to say Clinton came out of the process cost-free, for he had acted so indecisively
in choosing nominees that his political foes learned that he could be easily rolled into
avoiding troublesome nominations and pushed toward making ones more agreeable
to them.
Secondly, my models reflect an important dynamic in the selection process.
They are premised on the unusual power and opportunity that Presidents have to set
the terms of debate in a confirmation proceeding. Senators simply have more limited
power to set or influence the agenda in a confirmation proceeding because they are
largely confined in the process to a defensive posture. In structural terms, this means
that Senators face the structural disadvantage of being in a defensive posture
throughout almost the entirety of the appointments process. 11
Third, the basic terms of war and norms need to be defined. With neither do I
mean to rely on strict terms of art. I sometimes loosely use battle and war, though I
recognize the importance differences between them. Indeed, it is useful to keep in
mind that a Supreme Court contest is more like a battle than a war, for it generally
reflects or is waged against a backdrop of a larger contest among national political
leaders. One important mechanism in these battles consists of institutional norms, by
which I mean the informal understandings or arrangements among the leadership of

8.
GERHARDT, APPOINlMENTS, supra note 7, at 354 n.45.
DAVID A. YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES viii (1999).
9.
10.
/d.
11.
John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEx. L. REv. 633,652-59 (1993).
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national institutions developed over time and deviations from which often trigger
sanctions or disapproval. 12
Fourth, it is helpful to recognize the likely nonns applicable in the Supreme
Court appointments process. The most robust of these is senatorial courtesy, which
manifests itself in at least two ways. 13 The first is the deference usually (but
admittedly not always) given by Senators to the nomination of a colleague to the
Supreme Court. The Senate confirmed all six Senators nominated to the Court in the
twentieth century-Edward Douglass White as Chief Justice, and as Associate
Justices George Sutherland, Hugo Black, Jimmy Byrnes, Harold Burton, and
Sherman Minton. 14 The other robust norms, in my judgment, include good faith
consultation with the Senate, matching nominees to prevailing ethical and
professional expectations of the times, responsible or credible rhetoric in
characterizing nominees' credentials, and timing. These nonns are evident from the
conflicts surveyed or reviewed in the next Part.

ill. MODELS OF WAR
This Part surveys the two basic models of conflict in the Supreme Court
appointments process. In tum, I consider warrior Presidents who have invited
conflict and other Presidents who have ignored or discounted appointments nonns at
their or their nominees' peril.
A. The Warrior Presidents

In the classic The Art of War, Sun Tzu makes two trenchant observations that
one might imagine would resonate with most Presidents in making Supreme Court
nominations. The first is, "To win without fighting is best." 15 The other is that the
side that knows when to fight and when not will take the victory. "There are routes
not to be followed, armies not to be attacked, citadels not to be besieged. " 16 One has
to wonder why any President would disregard either of these, but many seem to have
done so. So, one obvious question with which to begin an analysis of the models of
conflicts within the Supreme Court appointments is why some Presidents seem to
welcome a fight? For it is clear that some Presidents-! call them the warrior

See id. at 652·59.
For a general discussion, see GERHARDT, APPOINTMENTS, supra note 7.
14.
Even people who have served in the House seem to have bad their nominations receive
substantial deference from the Senate. In the twentieth century, the former House members
successfully nominated to the Court include William Moody as Associate Justice and Fred Vinson as
Chief Justice.
15.
SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR vii (Thomas Cleary trans., 1988).
c 16.
Jd. at 125.
12.

13.

Supreme Court Selection as War

2002]

399

Presidents-make certain nominations with the expectations of heated opposition,
but do so because they conceive such contests as opportunities to defme themselves
or their political opposition or to consolidate political support. So much the better if
the Presidents can also prevail in the end. In other words, sometimes Presidents are
eager to do battle.
The warrior Presidents in American history tend to have one important thing in
common-they deliberately enter into or invite heated conflicts over nominees for the
sake of shaping or reshaping the basic norms or expectations in the process. Some
successful Presidents who have done just that are Andrew Jackson, Woodrow
Wilson, and Lyndon Johnson. Jackson purposefully set out to secure more
presidential discretion or control over Supreme Court nominationsP Like every
other nineteenth century President, Jackson confronted an imperial Senate bent on
maintaining its dominance or primacy in the appointments of Supreme Court
Justices, 18 but, unlike most other nineteenth century Presidents, Jackson sought to
reshape this basic balance of power. Consequently, he consulted little with Senate
leaders (including several who wanted to embarrass him) and made nominations that
he knew would trigger dramatic-and, he thought, sharply defining-conflicts. The
best known of these nominations was Roger Taney as an Associate Justice (following
his rejection as Treasury Secretary) and later as Chief Justice. President Jackson used
the rejections ofhis nominees to tarnish his opposition on the campaign trail, and by
the time he nominated Taney as Chief Justice he had managed to help a slim majority
of his party to take control of the Senate. Thus, it was with great delight he could
watch, on his last morning as President, his Vice President Martin Van Buren-who
only a few years before had his nomination as Ambassador to Great Britain rejected
by the Senate-succeed him as President and be sworn into the presidency by none
other than Taney.
The next two examples are President Woodrow Wilson's nomination of Louis
Brandeis and Lyndon Johnson's nomination of Thurgood Marshall. Separated by
almost five decades, the two nominations were alike in that in each the President
sought to break a glass ceiling in making the appointment. In other words, both
nominations were made for the sake of a larger principle for which the President
signaled unambiguously his willingness to fight. Wilson sought to nominate the first
Jew to serve on the Court, 19 while Johnson's objective was to nominate the first

17.

GERHARDT, APPOINTMENTS, supra note 7, at 52.
See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: Cl..EANING UP THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS (1994).
19.
I hasten to add that Judah Benjamin was the first Jew considered seriously for
appointment to the Court. After failing to get other nominees confirmed to the Court, President
Millard Fillmore made known his interest in nominating Benjamin to the Court. Senate leaders made
known their willingness to confirm Benjamin who had recently been elected to the Senate. Benjamin
asked Fillmore not to nominate him to the Court because he preferred at the time to serve in the Senate.
18.
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African-American to the Court. As Johnson famously put it upon making the
nomination, "I believe it is the right thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man
and the right place."20 It was the right time in part because the President's party
controlled the Senate, and so the challenge for Johnson, as it was for Wilson, was to
keep his party firmly in line behind the nomination. Northern Democrats, liberals,
and moderates rallied in defense of the nomination, so, in spite of the nastiness and
bigotry of some Southern Democrats the Senate conftrmed his nomination, 69-11.
The fmal example of a warrior President is Ronald Reagan in 1986. Near the
height of his popularity, Reagan was willing, as Roosevelt and Wilson before him, to
expend his popularity for the sake of marking a shift in the Court's direction. His
dual nomination ofRehnquist and Scalia was a bold move-indeed, it constitutes the
first and only time in history that a President has successfully nominated at the same
time someone as Chief Justice and another as an Associate Justice. It was
particularly bold, because the last time it had been tried it had failed miserably when
the Senate forced Lyndon Johnson's friend, Abe Fortas, to withdraw his nomination
as Chief Justice in 1968.21 Nevertheless, Reagan and his staff calculated correctly
that the Rehnquist nomination would not only get through the Senate but run
interference for the Scalia nomination. They figured that Democratic Senators who
were likely to be disposed against both of the nominees would not have the political
capital to oppose both, so they would have to choose one to contest. They chose
Rehnquist, who received the most negative votes ever cast against a nominee for the
chief justiceship; but, having failed to defeat his nomination, Democratic Senators
had nothing left to contest the nomination of the ftrst Italian-American ever to the
Court. 22
There have been, however, examples of warrior Presidents who have fared not
so well. Any great military strategist will tell you, war is risky, and thus an assault on
an institutional norm carries no guarantees of success. For example, two other
Presidents-James K. Polk and Grover Cleveland-deliberately invited hostilities in
the hopes of diminishing or thwarting the norm of Senatorial courtesy in the
nineteenth century. The practice in place at the time was that Senators expected
Presidents to consult with them before nominating people from their states to the
Court. Polk, perhaps emboldened by the example of his mentor Jackson a few years
before, deliberately challenged the norm. In 1846, he nominated George Woodward
to a vacancy on the Court that the Senate had blocked his predecessor John Tyler

EuN. EVANS, JUDAH P. BENJAMIN: THE JEWISH CONFEDERATE 83-84 (1988). It is of course telling
that Fillmore would have been able to overcome the political opposition to his making a Supreme
Court appointment as well as any of the prejudice of the times against Jews through senatorial courtesy.
20.
YALOF, supra note 9, at 90.
21.
See id. at 94.
22.
!d. at 155.
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from filling in 1844. Though Woodward was from Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania
Senator Simon Cameron was decidedly against the nomination not only because Polk
had refused to get his consent to the nomination before making it but also because
Polk had not consulted James Buchanan, another powerful Pennsylvanian who was
serving as Polk's Secretary of State, to sign off on it beforehand. With Buchanan and
Cameron incensed about being cut out of the nomination process, the nomination
lacked critical support in the Senate. Cameron took the lead in opposing it in the
Senate, and he prevailed in part because other Senators figured their defense of the
prerogative would work to their institutional advantage. 23
Almost five decades later, Grover Cleveland in 1893 found himself fighting a
similar battle. In his second term, Cleveland got his third chance to make a Supreme
Court appointment. Because the retiring Justice was from New York, the expectation
was that President Cleveland would fill a seat with a New Yorker agreeable to the
senior Senator from his party. Cleveland turned twice to New Yorkers, each of
whom were widely considered to be eminently qualified but each had not been
cleared with New York's senior Senator David Hill who, like Cameron before,
gathered his colleagues to defend the prerogative of senatorial courtesy. Cleveland
had been willing to cater to the prevailing practice of filling a vacancy with someone
from the retiring Justice's state, but he was not disposed to cater to Hill, who led an
anti-Cleveland faction of New York Democrats. Rather than nominate yet another
New Yorker after the Senate had rejected two of his nominees at Hill's bidding,
President Cleveland turned to a different norm to defeat Hill's claim; he nominated
Louisiana Senator Edward Douglass White, whom the Senate quickly unanimously
confirmed.
Interestingly, when Justice Howell Jackson, a Southerner, died unexpectedly in
1895, President Cleveland did not tum to a Southerner. Instead, he turned to a New
Yorker. This time, he asked for Senator Hill's approval, which Hill gave. 24 In so
doing, Cleveland was able to diminish the strength of the longstanding expectations
that a President would replace a retiring Justice with a nominee from the same state.
In other words, Cleveland had found a way to employ existing norms to divide and
conquer expected opposition.

B. Mistakes in War
Much more often than not, the Presidents who have failed have done so
because they have failed to follow or heed institutional norms or longstanding

23.

. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS: A HisTORY OF THE U.S.

SUPREME CoURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CUNTON

1992).
24.

/d. at 146.

109 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed.
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expectations or practices. I mention only two of the more dramatic such failures.
The first is the dual nominations to which I just referred-Johnson's nominations of
Fortas as Chief Justice and Homer Thornberry to replace Fortas. 25 There was a lot
that went wrong with these nominations. The most serious problems were Johnson's
failures to adhere to basic norms. The first was that he had failed to consult with
Senate leaders over his rather unorthodox nominations. Indeed, Johnson's dual
nominations constituted the first time that a President was nominating a Chief Justice
along with another nominee to the Court. Many Senators were not amused that
Johnson was being so brash.
The second norm Johnson breached sealed his undoing because he made the
nominations in an election year in which he was a lame duck. Had Johnson
consulted history, he would have discovered that this was a period at which
Presidents have tended to wield their lowest influence whatsoever in nominating
Justices. 26
Surprisingly, Richard Nixon did not learn from Johnson's mistakes or history
as Clausewitz suggests a good general should do. 27 Indeed, President Nixon failed to
heed the warning of the events that brought about the vacancy he was trying to fill
with the nomination of Clement Haynsworth. Fortas' nomination as Chief Justice
failed in part because of his poor ethical judgment, and he left the Court under a
cloud because of other ethical breaches brought to light after his failed nomination as
Chief Justice. Nixon failed to foresee that Democratic Senators might have learned
from Fortas' failure. In particular, Democratic Senators might have learned that a
nominee's ethical breaches can torpedo his nomination-this was not a new lesson in
the appointments process, but it had not been the focus of Supreme Court selection.
PresidentNixon was perhaps led into a false sense of security by the fact that the
Judicial Conference had not found Haynsworth had sat on some cases in spite of
possible conflicts of interest; he could not have expected Democrats, on the heels of
Fortas' debacle, to have been so generous. Bent on payback for the failure of the
Fortas nomination, Democratic Senators regarded Haynsworth 's ethical problems as
bad as Fortas' and, at the same time, wanted to signal a new era in Supreme Court
selection in which nominees could generally be expected to meet a higher ethical
standard.
Interestingly, Presidents Johnson and Nixon both committed another
fundamental mistake in nominating Justices. Clausewitz warns that commanders

25.
For an excellent, recent analysis of the fates of these nominations, see YALOFF, supra
note 9, at 91-94.
26.
GERHARDT, APPoiNfMENTS, supra note 7, at 123.
CARL VoN CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 170-74 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds.,
27.
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832).
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should refrain from making decisions based on emotions or the heat of the moment, 28
but Johnson and Nixon each allowed their emotions to get the better of them in
making certain nominations. This was the case, of course, with the dual nominations
of Fortas as Chief Justice and Thornberry to replace Fortas. The nominations not
only signaled a degree of overconfidence on the part of Johnson that turned off some
Senators, but Johnson did not bother to consult with Senators about his prospective
choices. His loyalty to his friends got the better of him.
It was anger, not loyalty, that undid President Nixon's nomination of Harold
Carswell. Angered by the Senate's rejection of Haynsworth, Nixon responded
quickly with the nomination of Carswell in the hopes of catching some Senators off
balance and in effect daring the Senate to alienate an important constituency. 29
Interestingly, President Reagan reacted to some extent in the same way in the
immediate aftermath of Bork's rejection by waiting only a few days indicate his
intention to nominate Douglas Ginsburg. 30 PresidentReagan hoped no doubt to
secure a similar nominee ideologically but no more attractive (and in some ways
more problematic) than the nominee just rejected. In the cases of Carswell and
Ginsburg, the Senate moved relatively quickly against the nominees in part because
of the offense felt by the majority at being dissed by the President.
It is even possible that a President fails to learn from history (or the past
patterns of success) in the process he employs for choosing a nominee. Indeed,
Clausewitz also suggests a general in times of war needs to make his chain of
command as short as possible. In any event, in both times that Bill Clinton had to
choose a Supreme Court nominee he failed both to learn from the prior practices of
administrations in consolidating authority over nominations as well as the basic tactic
of keeping his chain as short as possible. Instead, in choosing his nominee he shifted
his criteria more than once and shifted authority and sought advice from different
quarters when he was frustrated with the advice he was getting. 31 The end results
were painfully protracted processes for picking nominees coupled with the further
painful practice of sometimes floating names publicly to get reactions and then
dropping the names when public opposition began to coalesce. The lack of a clear
hierarchy for making the decision invited turf wars over the people who would be
responsible for advising the President.
One cannot conclude with a commentary on war over Supreme Court nominees
without recognizing the special problems faced by an unelected President. With a
few notable exceptions discussed in the next Part, vice presidents who have ascended
to the presidency because of a President's death have encountered serious hostilities

28.
29.
30.
31.

/d. at 106-07.
See YALOFF, supra note 9, at 108-12.
SHELDON GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 317 (1997).
See Y ALOFF, supra note 9, at 196-205.
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when they have tried to assert a mandate different from the ones advanced by their
predecessors. Without a mandate of their own, these unelected Presidents have run
the risk ofhaving no political base of support for their actions as President, including
but not limited to nominating Justices. This was surely the case with both Tyler32 and
Fillmore,33 each of whom had not shared his President's political outlook and each of
whom was viewed as a pariah by some important constituencies within the
President's party. These circumstances would have perhaps counseled the Presidents
to use nominations as an olive branch to their potential political foes, but neither did
so; both made nominations for which they simply had no mandates. Moreover,
without political futures in their futures, Senate leaders saw little downside to
scuttling their nominees until a more agreeable President came along, with the
Senate's rejecting five of Tyler's six nominations34 and three of Fillmore's four
nominations to fill vacancies arising during their respective presidencies. 35
IV. ACHIEVING PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
In this Part, I consider two models in which serious combat over a Supreme
Court nominee was averted. The first is presidential abdication of authority or simply
giving the Senate carte blanche. The second is Presidents' deft manipulation of
institutional norms to achieve both their short- and long-term objectives. After
surveying both models, I suggest some lessons and implications to derive from a
survey of both of them in operation.
A. Presidential Abdication ofAuthority
In American history, only two Presidents effectively allowed Senate leaders to
choose Supreme Court nominees. In each case, the President lacked the political
clout or support at the time a vacancy arose to assert his will over the process. The
choice to fight or lay down, when it came, was easily made, because the President
simply foresaw nothing but disaster if he did not abdicate his authority in filling the
vacancy.
The first instance of abdication involved Ulysses Grant. Vacancies arose on
the Court in both 1869 and 1870 for President Grant to fill. In 1869, he nominated
his very able Attorney General Ebenezer Hoar to one. Hoar faced considerable and
ultimately fatal opposition in the Senate, because he had relentlessly alienated Senate

32.
For a discussion ofTyler's difficulties in the appointments process. see JosEPH HARRis,
THE ADVICE AND CoNSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE CoNFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE
UNITED STATES SENATE (1953).

33.
34.
3S.
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leaders by urging lower court appointments based on merit rather than patronage.
Grant's eagerness to appoint Hoar, coupled with his deteriorating political strength,
gave him virtually no leverage in making the nomination. 36 In the aftermath of the
Senate's rejection of Hoar and Grant's request that the Senate reconsider Hoar's
nomination, the President acceded to a petition signed by a large majority of the
House and Senate urging him to nominate Lincoln's War Secretary Edwin Stanton
for a second vacancy that had arisen in the meantime. Grant figured ifhe nominated
Stanton, more a political foe than friend, to the one vacancy the Senate might agree to
his preferred nominee Hoar for the other. He was wrong. The Senate quickly
confirmed Stanton, but before it took any action to reconsider Hoar's nomination
(which it had already rejected once earlier in the year) Stanton died of a heart attack.
With Stanton dead, the deal, if it ever was on, was also dead, and the Senate refused
to re-consider Hoar.37
The second instance of abdication occurred in 1932.38 By the time the vacancy
arose, Hoover had largely squandered the support of the leadership of his own party,
in part because he had sought to refuse to give them their customary control over
lower court appointments. When Holmes announced his impending retirement from
the Court, Hoover came up with a list of ten candidates, but the list proved futile.
When Senate leaders learned of the list, they indicated that the only name they would
consider was that of Benjamin Cardozo. With so many other domestic and
international crises to handle, Hoover did not dally; he cut the deal, made the
nomination, and moved on.

B. The Pacifzst or Noncombatant Presidents
In contrast to the so-called warrior Presidents, the pacifist Presidents have
employed institutional norms or longstanding expectations or practices to secure their
desired objectives in the Supreme Court selection process. The first example is none
other than Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln understood that on domestic matters the
Congress generally considered itself supreme. In his early days in politics Lincoln
was a Whig, a party dedicated to congressional supremacy on legislative policy.
Lincoln was, in other words, no Jacksonian when it came to the domestic powers of
the presidency. So, Lincoln commonly deferred to the Congress on domestic matters,
including patronage appointments to all kinds of office. His deference was not,
however, automatic or extreme; it was usually based on each side getting something

36.
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out of the appointment. Lincoln's Supreme Court appointments would prove to be
different only in degree not in kind from the other appointments he made as
President. Consequently, he generally deferred to congressional leaders on the
candidates for filling vacancies with the primary condition ihat they met criteria set
forth for their selection by the President. In all six appointments he made to the
Court, Lincoln faced no serious conflict with Senators but instead was able to fmd
nominees agreeable to Republican leaders each time.
Franklin D. Roosevelt is a second example of a President adept at employing
institutional norms to get his way. When he fmally got an opportunity to fill a
vacancy on the Court, it did not happen until the beginning of his second term.
When the vacancy fmally arose in 193 7, it proved to be a pivotal one, for the retiring
Justice was one of the most ardent opponents to constitutional foundations of the
New Deal-Willis Van DeVanter. There was no question there would be a fight,
because the appointment, if confirmed, would produce for the first time in the
Court's history a critical mass of Justices who opposed economic due process and
supported greater judicial deference to congressional exercises of its Commerce
Clause power. Roosevelt was not interested in a compromise. His nomination
proved to be surprising not because he turned to a Senator or an ardent supporter of
the New Deal, but rather he turned to someone who, as a Senator, had not been
known as a great constitutional thinker (like Sutherland) but as an ardent partisan.
The views of his nominee, Hugo Black, were well known to his colleagues in the
Senate, but the powerful norm of Senatorial deference to the nomination of a
colleague to the Court worked in Black's favor and led many Senators who might
have opposed him otherwise to accept his nomination begrudgingly.
Though Bill Clinton's search for a Supreme Court nominee hardly followed
the paths set by Lincoln and Roosevelt, he was able in the end to find nominees
whom the Senate quickly and congenially accepted. He achieved these outcomes in
part because he both consulted seriously with Senate leaders from both parties in the
hopes of reaching accommodations with them and accepted the developing norm in
the Senate to fill vacancies on the Court with sitting judges. 39 In making these
accommodations, President Clinton did not, however, abdicate presidential authority.
Throughout his process he had sufficiently open, pliable criteria that could be met by
any number of able people. By having a relatively open vetting process in choosing
nominees, he made it possible for Senate leaders and others to shoot down
problematic nominations before they could be made. In the end, President Clinton
claimed victory in part by accepting the terms on which the Senate (and others) were
laying down as indispensable to the nominations being made. He could claim the
victory because the terms were consistent with the basic criteria he had set forth at
the outset of his search.

39.
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Even Presidents who have lacked the electoral successes ofLincoln, Roosevelt,
and Lincoln have succeeded in maneuvering the Supreme Court selection process
with little or no warfare. Two interesting examples are Chester Arthur's two
Supreme Court appointments and Theodore Roosevelt before he was elected to the
presidency in his own right.
Few if any Presidents have entered office with lower expectations than Chester
Arthur, though few have wielded or maneuvered around the norms of Supreme Court
appointments more ably than he did. 40 Several factors help to explain Arthur's
success. First, he benefited enormously from lowered expectations. The only office
of note held by Arthur prior to being selected as Garfield's running mate was the
Collector of the Port Authority of New York. Both this position and his selection as
Garfield's running mate were arranged by his mentor Senator Roscoe Conkling. So,
when Arthur ascended to the presidency, most feared he would simply do Conkling's
bidding. To the extent he made nominations that exceeded people's expectations, it
was a pleasant and welcome surprise. Second, Arthur's attempt to fill one of the
vacancies in 1882 with his old boss Conkling tracked rather than breached the norms
of Supreme Court appointments, for, as a powerful Senator, Conkling was the
beneficiary of the robust norm of senatorial courtesy. Though not widely elated,
Senators overwhelmingly confirmed Conkling to the vacancy. When Conkling
decided immediately after his confirmation not to serve on the Court, the vacancy
passed again to Arthur, but this time Senators could heave another collective sigh of
relief because they knew Conkling would no longer be a candidate. Third, Arthur
appreciated and took advantage of the timing. Garfield's assassination by a frustrated
office-seeker dramatized the need, long discounted by both parties, for a professional
civil service. Arthur recognized that the time had come for such legislation, and
became the first President to sign the Civil Service Act into law. Arthur took the
additional step of raising the standards for appointments all around, including the
Supreme Court.41 His two nominations, besides Conkling, were of first-rate, widely
respected state court jurists. These appointments helped the Republican Party claim
the political advantage in taking the lead on merit-based appointments, whose time
had then come. Last but not least, Arthur's two Supreme Court appointees were
ideologically and regionally agreeable to Senate leaders. This acceptability, coupled
with the outstanding records of the nominees, ensured their smooth confirmation.

40.
ABRAHAM, supra note 23, at 137-39. One reason Arthur might have acted contrary to
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41.
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The next vice president to ascend to the presidency as a result of a presidential
assassination was Teddy Roosevelt in 1901. 42 Like Arthur, he would have the
opportunity to fill a vacancy on the Court shortly after taking office. At that time,
Roosevelt was distrusted by many of the leaders of his own party, some of whom
thought he was crazy, while many Democrats had little or no idea what to expect
from him. Many Senators feared Roosevelt not just because of his brazenness but
also his obsession with reform; they worried about the extent to which he would
challenge prevailing norms, including those applying to appointments.
Though unelected and without a mandate of his own, Theodore Roosevelt
succeeded masterly in making his first Supreme Court appointment his own. There
are several reasons for this success. First, he set his model for a Supreme Court
appointment extraordinarily high. As he pondered his choice, he explained to his
patron Senator Henry Cabot Lodge that he wanted to appoint someone on the order
of John Marshall. 43 President Roosevelt considered Marshall's greatness to have
been his steadfast commitment to the broad constitutional principles of his political
party, which Roosevelt thought history had proven as correct. Convinced that history
would prove his own party's principles as the right ones for the country, Roosevelt
wanted someone who both shared his party's principles and could stick to them as
fiercely as Marshall did. As a practical matter, this meant he would look for someone
who shared similar views as the retiring Justice, none other than Horace Gray of
Massachusetts. In looking for such a nominee, Roosevelt could be certain to fmd a
person agreeable to Republican leaders as well as someone from the state of the
retiring Justice. Thus, the nominee enjoyed the support of Roosevelt's mentor
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Second, President Roosevelt's choice was one of the
leading jurists in the country, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The choice was astute in
part because it could be guaranteed not only to appeal to those who would have
wanted to see another person from Massachusetts appointed, but also to those who
were interested in finding a like-minded jurist to replace Gray. Moreover, Holmes'
stature guaranteed he would be a difficult (but admittedly not impossible) target. The
question was whether the likely opposition to the appointment, even from within
Roosevelt's party, was prepared to take on an icon. Third, in making the nomination,
President Roosevelt signaled his willingness to fight. In some cases, as we have seen
with President Clinton, signaling indecisiveness or ambivalence can invite attack, but
Roosevelt wanted to squelch any attack by making clear his willingness not just to go
to war with any opposition but to take his case to the American people. His models
of the presidency were Lincoln and Jackson and so he was fully prepared to do battle
if necessary. The opposition blinked, and Holmes was easily confirmed.

42.
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V. LIKELY FUTURE PATIERNS OF CONFLICTS

My sketch of some of the models of Supreme Court appointments helps to
focus attention on two other significant patterns in the process. The first involves the
rhetoric employed in confirmation contests. At least two different rhetorical patterns
are noteworthy in the process. On the one hand, presidential rhetoric literally can set
the terms of debate. Their rhetoric thus can both help and hurt their nominees,
because the process allows Presidents (and their nominees) to be held accountable for
the expectations they raise through their comments about their nominees'
qualifications. Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg both became rather
formidable nominees in part because they were as good as the Presidents who
nominated them claimed them to be,44 but President George H. W. Bush's
characterization of Clarence Thomas as ''the most qualified person in the country'' to
replace Thurgood Marshall created problems for the nominee because Thomas was
not yet up to matching that demanding description. 45
The second pattern involves the efforts of the contending sides to demonize
each other in contests over Supreme Court appointments. The objective of the
supporters of a nomination has been to demonize people who oppose the nomination,
while the opponents of a nomination have tended to demonize the nominee.
Interestingly, the efforts to demonize opposition tracks the rhetoric employed in times
of war. A recent headline in the New York Times suggestively reads, A Nation
Defines Itself by Its Evil Enemies. 46 The article suggests that in a war national leaders
tend to rally support by demonizing the enemy. The same holds true in judicial
confirmation proceedings in which the contending sides follow a similar strategy.
Bork was famously characterized as well outside the mainstream,47 while a series of
successful nominees have been defended as moderate or principled conservatives in
the great tradition of justices whom most Senators are thought to admire and want
nominees to resemble. 4s
The second pattern of note is the one with which I began involving the likely
relevance of war to the selection of a Justice. As one might expect, a great deal
depends on the popularity of the war during which a President has nominated a
justice. Only a few Presidents have made Supreme Court nominations in times of
war, only two of which were fighting for a cause popular with most Senators. The
two were Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The point at which President
Roosevelt's approach to Supreme Court selection most closely resembled President
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Lincoln's was the 1940s, the period in which of course the nation formally entered
the Second World War. In these years, Roosevelt's nominees were Jimmy Byrnes in
June 1941, Stone as Chief Justice also in June 1941 (the day on which the Senate
confirmed Byrnes), and Wiley Rutledge in February 1943.49 Byrnes was a former
Senator and thus able to take advantage of Senatorial courtesy. Stone was a
Republican whose nomination bespoke of bipartisanship and a desire on the part of
the President to put aside party differences as best he could under the circumstances.
Rutledge was a relatively inoffensive nominee whom most Senators did not know or
take the time to know. In contrast to either Lincoln or Roosevelt, Richard Nixon
never received any deference from the Senate because his nominations coincided
with the ongoing Vietnam War. Nixon's refusal to consult with Senate leaders,
combined with the increasing unpopularity of the war, ensured that his nominees
received no special consideration once they reached the floor of the Senate. 5°

VI. CONCLUSION
I have tried to suggest war is not inevitable in the Supreme Court appointments
process. It can be avoided if political leaders choose to follow the nonns they have
developed over the years for guiding the process. War breaks out when Presidents
breach these nonns.
Since war is, in Clausewitz' famous judgment, an extension of politics, one is
left to wonder about the politics or motives driving combat over Supreme Court
appointments. In considering the reasons for combat, I cannot help but recall a
question raised by Winston Churchill in the midst of World War II. When asked
whether the East End of London should be shut down and theater productions
stopped because of the bombing of the city, Churchill responded, ''No. What the hell
do you think we are fighting for?" As combats erupt over Supreme Court
appointments, it is useful to ask, in a similar vein, "What are each of the sides
fighting for, and what do these contests tell us about them and, more importantly,
us?"
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